About this case study: This narrative explains the nature of corrupt activities relating to high-profile cases, and is produced in the public interest. It relies on the final reports from the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture, Corruption, and Fraud in the Public Sector, including Organs of State (the Zondo Commission), court documents, books, investigative journalism reporting, and other media articles, all in the public domain. The ISS has made all reasonable attempts to report the details accurately. Details for the cases in the Zondo Commission reports are provided up to December 2023. Further updates are ‘Recent Case Updates’ section below.

The Story

Story summary
Companies Involved
Key Players
Eskom is South Africa’s main power utility and a state-owned enterprise. A takeover of Eskom’s board by the Guptas and their allies led to the loss of R14.7bn in corrupt contracts and negatively impacted Eskom’s energy output.

A takeover of the Eskom board by the Guptas and their allies was completed by 2015. They then reportedly used this position of power to instigate and execute several corrupt contracts that cost Eskom billions of rands. The Guptas allegedly funnelled money from Eskom to Tegeta – their main mining company – through a series of irregular pre-payments for coal in order to purchase Optimum Coal Holdings from Glencore, a large resource and energy multinational. Tegeta secured a procurement contract with Eskom for low-quality coal from their Brakfontein Mine, severely impacting Eskom’s energy output. Eskom also reportedly ended up paying vast amounts through corrupt contracts with McKinsey (R1.1bn), Trillian (R730.6m) and Asea Brown Boveri (ABB) South Africa (R2.2bn), through which Gupta allies earned significant kickbacks.

Summary of companies involved:

COMPANY NAME DESCRIPTION
Tegeta Guptas’ mining company
Oakbay Guptas’ flagship investment company
Glencore Multinational resource and energy company acquired by Tegeta
Optimum Coal Holdings (OCH) Coal mining company and subsidiary of Glencore
Optimum Coal Mine (OCM) Coal mine belonging to OCH
Hedrina power station Main recipient of coal from OCM
Optimum and Koornfontein mine rehabilitation trusts Trusts worth R1.75bn
Brakfontein Mine Mine belonging to the Guptas
McKinsey Multinational consulting company
Regiments Capital A private equity company and McKinsey’s subcontracted partner
Trillian Company founded by Essa and Wood when they broke away from Regiments
Asea Brown Boveri (ABB) Swedish-Swiss robotics company, parent to Asea Brown Boveri South Africa (ABB)
Asea Brown Boveri South Africa (ZAABB) South African branch of ABB (ZAABB)
Leago Group A diversified holding company with subsidiaries operating in multiple sectors
Impulse International Engineering and project management group
Huarong Energy Africa Subsidiary of Chinese company Huarong
Jacob Zuma

Jacob Zuma

President Alleged misconduct: Appointed allies as ministers to help replace the board with Gupta allies. Unlawfully interfered in board meetings.

Status of accountability

No charges have been brought against him relating to Eskom.

Lynne Brown

Lynne Brown

Minister of Public Enterprises Alleged misconduct: Removed executives and replaced board members with Gupta allies, including Brian Molefe.

Status of accountability

No corruption charges have been brought against her relating to Eskom.

Salim Essa

Salim Essa

Trillian director and Gupta associate Alleged misconduct: Had regular contact with Lynne Brown in connection to replacing Eskom’s board. Involved in facilitating the settlement between Tegeta and Glencore.

Status of accountability

Essa moved to Dubai but is under investigation and the National Prosecuting Authority will seek his extradition once he is indicted.

guptas

The Guptas

Alleged misconduct: Rajesh ‘Tony’ Gupta allegedly accused Zola Tsotsi, then Eskom board chair, of not sufficiently supporting the Gupta projects. Tsotsi was subsequently ousted and replaced with Ben Ngubane.

Status of accountability

In June 2022, Tony and Atul Gupta were arrested in Dubai on criminal charges filed against them in South Africa related to state capture allegations. In April 2023, the Dubai Appeal Court denied South Africa’s application to extradite the two Gupta brothers to stand trial.

Matshela Koko

Matshela Koko

Eskom Acting Chief Executive Officer and Group Executive: Technology and Commercial Alleged misconduct: Knew about the plan to replace the board and agreed to be suspended knowing he would be reinstated.

Status of accountability

Arrested, along with his wife and stepdaughters, for corruption, fraud and money laundering pertaining to the Kusile Power Station in October 2022. The case was struck off the roll in November 2023 due to procedural delays.

Dudu Myeni

Dudu Myeni

South African Airways board chairperson Alleged misconduct: Recommended to Zuma that he conduct a ‘review’ of Eskom, which was reportedly used as a pretext to suspend executives.

Status of accountability

No criminal charges have been brought against her relating to Eskom. She died in 2024.

Anoj Singh

Anoj Singh

Eskom Chief Financial Officer Alleged misconduct: Helped finalise the resolution to create the guarantee for Tegeta. Admitted to knowing the Guptas were facing bank account closures while encouraging business relations with Tegeta.

Status of accountability

Stripped of his Chartered Accountant status by the South African Institute of Chartered Accountants in 2020. No criminal charges have been brought against him relating to Eskom.

Brian Molefe

Brian Molefe

Eskom Acting Chief Executive Officer Alleged misconduct: Pressured Glencore into selling to Tegeta.

Status of accountability

Ordered to repay over R9.9m obtained illegally from the Eskom Pension and Provident Fund in July 2022. He petitioned the Supreme Court of Appeal on the matter.

Suzanne Daniels

Suzanne Daniels

Eskom Legal Chief Alleged misconduct: Drafted documents containing fabrications that led to Tegeta acquiring Glencore and helped Tegeta find funds to purchase Optimum Coal Holdings. Drafted documents to justify and ensure the approval of two pre-purchases of coal worth R2.33bn. Involved in ensuring a reduced penalty fee for Tegeta.

Status of accountability

No criminal charges have been brought against her relating to Eskom.

Ben Ngubane

Dr Ben Ngubane

Eskom Board Chair Alleged misconduct: With Brian Molefe, allegedly pressured the Minister of Mineral Resources to suspend Glencore’s mining licences so Glencore would sell to Tegeta.

Status of accountability

He died in July 2021.

Mosobenzi Zwane

Mosobenzi Zwane

Minister of Mineral Resources Alleged misconduct: Encouraged Glasenberg to sell Glencore to Tegeta and connected Salim Essa to Glasenberg and Ephron so that the parties could organise an acquisition deal. Benefitted from travel and a car paid for by the Guptas.

Status of accountability

No criminal charges have been brought against him relating to Eskom.

Ayanda Nteta

Dr Ayanda Nteta

Eskom Fuel Sourcing Division Acting Director Alleged misconduct: Had access to Eskom’s April 2016 Supply Plan, indicating that she knew that the reason given for the R659m pre-payment for coal was not true but ensured it happened anyway.

Status of accountability

Resigned in 2018 before disciplinary proceedings against her could begin. No criminal charges have been brought against her.

Eric Wood

Eric Wood

Trillian founder Alleged misconduct: Ensured Trillian was paid by Eskom for work not executed. Eskom paid Trillian R700m in connection with the Master Services Agreement contract even after McKinsey had rejected any association with the company.

Status of accountability

No charges have been brought against him relating to Eskom.

Koketso Aren

Koketso Aren née Choma

Impulse director and stepdaughter of Matshela Koko Alleged misconduct: Bought shares in and became a director of Impulse after it secured a subcontract from Asea Brown Boveri South Africa. The funds were paid by Impulse to front companies and then to Koko family members.

Status of accountability

Faced charges of corruption, fraud and money laundering. The case was struck off the roll in November 2023 due to procedural delays.

Thabo Mokwena

Dr Thabo Mokwena

Chairman of the Leago International Group Alleged misconduct: Friends with Koko, who allegedly helped Mokwena’s company Leago secure a subcontracting deal with ZAABB.

Status of accountability

No criminal charges have been brought against him.

Markus Bruegmann

Markus Bruegmann

ABB senior executive and German citizen Alleged misconduct: Instructed his team to contact Koko to move ahead with obtaining the Control and Instrumentation contract.

Status of accountability

Resigned as Chief Executive Officer of Rock Tech Lithium when corruption allegations surfaced about his connection to the Kusile project.

Sunil Vip

Sunil Vip

ABB senior employee and German citizen Alleged misconduct: Provided Asea Brown Boveri South Africa with inside information from Eskom.

Status of accountability

Charged in absentia with corruption, fraud and money laundering linked to the Kusile Power Station. Interpol has issued a red notice for him.

Dietrich Wolff

Götz Dietrich Wolff

ABB Africa Business Unit manager Alleged misconduct: Knew of Bruegmann’s attempts to make contact with Koko and secure the tender.

Status of accountability

Turned state witness.

Mohammed Mooidheen

Mohammed Mooidheen

ZAABB senior employee Alleged misconduct: Along with his wife, Raeesa Mooidheen, received significant kickbacks for his complicity in awarding the irregular Impulse contract.

Status of accountability

He and his wife face charges of corruption, money laundering, fraud and forgery. The Asset Forfeiture Unit of the NPA secured a R583.8m restraint order against him in April 2023.

Vernon Pillay

Vernon Pillay

ZAABB senior employee Alleged misconduct: Along with his wife, Aradhna Pillay, received significant kickbacks for his complicity in awarding the irregular Impulse contract.

Status of accountability

He and his wife face charges of corruption, money laundering, fraud and forgery. The Asset Forfeiture Unit of the National Prosecuting Authority secured a R583.8m restraint order relating to his assets in April 2023.

Sean Maritz

Sean Maritz

Eskom Acting Chief Executive Officer Alleged misconduct: Followed through with Singh’s plans to attempt to secure an irregular contract with Huarong Energy Africa. Hired a friend at Eskom at a salary of R100 000 per month without revealing the nature of their relationship.

Status of accountability

Resigned from Eskom before disciplinary measures could be taken against him. No criminal charges have been brought against him.

InsightISS Analysis

Our key insights on this case

Lessons for prevention and early intervention

Story 1Eskom board

Summary
Timeline
Key Players
Eskom’s board was replaced with individuals who would reportedly serve the interests of the Guptas and the state officials they were allegedly colluding with. Only two out of more than 12 new Eskom board members did not have connections to the Guptas. Many had reportedly never served on a board before. In March 2015, the board turnover was completed with the dismissal of three key Eskom executives.

2014

Then-president Jacob Zuma replaced Minister of Public Enterprises, Malusi Gigaba, with Lynne Brown. The Zondo Commission states that Zuma was integral to strategic appointments that helped the Guptas get a foothold in many state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Gigaba had allegedly assisted the Guptas in previous ventures but the relationship had reportedly ‘cooled’. Brown has been termed a ‘Gupta minister’ for her alleged role in facilitating state capture at several SOEs, including Eskom.

2015

February: Zuma issued instructions to Matsietsi Mokholo, director general of the Department of Public Enterprises, to postpone a board meeting. This was unlawful because Zuma did not have the power to decide when the board should meet. Mokholo conveyed the instructions to the board chair at the time, Zola Tsotsi.

March: Before the postponed board meeting, Zuma met with Tsotsi, Nicholas Linnell and Dudu Myeni. Myeni was the South African Airways (SAA) board chairperson at the time and had close connections to Zuma. She recommended Linnell to Zuma based on a review of SAA that Linnell had conducted. The plan was that four Eskom executives were to be suspended, allegedly under the guise of Linnell’s review of the SOE. This review only lasted six weeks and was never completed.

On 10 March, at a meeting in Melrose Arch, Matshela Koko (the acting Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Eskom) informed Suzanne Daniels (Eskom’s legal head) and Abram Masongo that four executives, himself included, would be suspended. Koko allegedly mentioned he would be allowed to return.

At a meeting the next day, Brown confirmed the suspension of the following executives: Tshediso Matona, Tsholofelo Molefe, Dan Marokane and Koko. Matona lodged a dismissal dispute at the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration, which attracted Zuma’s attention. Zuma apologised and offered him another job in government, as head of the secretariat at the National Planning Commission. Matona also reportedly received a R6m exit package and significant contributions to his Government Employees Pension Fund that would add 10 years’ worth of employment to his pension figure. Molefe and Marokane received R8.2 and R6.2m exit packages respectively, as well as unspecified pension earnings. Koko was only temporarily suspended – a reported ruse to avoid suspicion of his connections to the Guptas – and was quickly reinstated.

Tony Gupta reportedly met with Tsotsi and accused him of not being sufficiently supportive of the Gupta projects. The board also began criticising Tsotsi, who was ousted and replaced by Dr Ben Ngubane.

April: Brown removed Norman Baloyi, who had formed part of the new board intake in 2014. Baloyi was the only person to speak out against the suspension of the Eskom executives. He had also challenged the board’s criticisms of Tsotsi, as well as a tender awarded to global IT firm T Systems via a Gupta-owned company. His removal completed the takeover of the board. Brown announced that Brian Molefe would be the acting CEO of Eskom. Molefe requested that Anoj Singh, who had been with him at Transnet, join him at Eskom and Singh was appointed Chief Financial Officer (CFO).

2016 – 2019

Eskom had five different CEOs between the end of Molefe’s tenure in November 2016 and January 2020.

2020

January: André de Ruyter was appointed CEO of Eskom. During his three-year tenure, he targeted coal theft syndicates and made efforts to shift from coal to renewable energy.

2022

December: De Ruyter’s policies reportedly attracted negative attention from politician Gwede Mantashe, Minister of Mineral Resources and Energy. Mantashe found his efforts to be misdirected in light of the ongoing load shedding, saying that Eskom’s lack of attention to load-shedding was ‘agitating for the overthrow of the state’. de Ruyter repeatedly cited corruption, mismanagement and lack of planning and maintenance for the severity of load shedding.

De Ruyter resigned as CEO of Eskom, saying that lack of support from the broader political economy had rendered his position ‘untenable’. The following day he drank a cup of coffee at work that had reportedly been laced with cyanide and fell ill. He laid a charge of attempted murder with the South African Police Service (SAPS).

2023

February: De Ruyter was interviewed by journalist Annika Larson on television news broadcaster eNCA, during which he alleged that Eskom was losing an estimated R1bn per month to corruption, theft and mafia-like networks in Mpumalanga. He stated that a high-ranking politician (who was also a Member of Parliament) was deeply involved in the demise of Eskom, but did not mention any names. The board removed him as CEO one month before his tenure was supposed to end.

A few days after the interview, the Daily Maverick reported that it had obtained intelligence reports containing evidence linking two senior members of the cabinet to criminal cartels in Eskom. It could not name them for legal reasons.

April: The Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA) questioned de Ruyter on the allegations he made during the eNCA interview. He refused to reveal the identities of the people he had alluded to. However, he informed SCOPA that he had given the names to Pravin Gordhan, Minister of Public Enterprises, the Hawks and SAPS, among other authorities. The committee said it would follow up with these authorities.

May: De Ruyter published a book called ‘Truth to Power: My Three Years Inside Eskom’, which details what he claims to be systemic corruption at Eskom and in the African National Congress (ANC).

September: SCOPA met with the Hawks, Special Investigating Unit (SIU), SAPS, and de Ruyter about a privately commissioned investigation into Eskom. The SIU said that de Ruyter should be charged with maladministration for contracting private entities—Business Leadership South Africa (BLSA) and George Fivaz Forensic & Risk (Fivaz)—without first consulting the Eskom board. Committee members cautioned law enforcement this before considering the content of the report by BLSA and Fivaz.

Jacob Zuma

Jacob Zuma

President Alleged misconduct: Appointed allies as ministers to help replace the Eskom board with Gupta allies and unlawfully interfered in board meetings.

Status of accountability

No criminal charges have been brought against him relating to Eskom.

Lynne Brown

Lynne Brown

Minister of Public Enterprises Alleged misconduct: Removed executives and replaced board members with people who were alleged to be Gupta allies, including Molefe.

Status of accountability

No criminal charges have been brought against her relating to Eskom.

Salim Essa

Salim Essa

Gupta associate Alleged misconduct: Had regular contact with Brown between November 2014 and March 2015, allegedly in connection with the replacement of Eskom’s board.

Status of accountability

Moved to Dubai but denied doing so to avoid legal processes in South Africa. He filed an application to have numerous sections of the findings from the Zondo Commission set aside. He is under investigation and the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) will seek his extradition once he is indicted.

guptas

The Guptas

Alleged misconduct: Rajesh ‘Tony’ Gupta had one-on-one dealings with Tsotsi, allegedly accusing him of not sufficiently supporting the Gupta projects. Tsotsi was subsequently ousted as Eskom board chair and replaced with Ngubane.

Status of accountability

In June 2022, Rajesh and Atul Gupta were arrested in Dubai on criminal charges of money laundering and corruption filed against them in South Africa. In April 2023, the Dubai Appeal Court in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) rejected their extradition to face trial in Bloemfontein. The Minister of Justice and Correctional Services has since engaged with the UAE to appeal this ruling.

Matshela Koko

Matshela Koko

Eskom Acting CEO and Group Executive: Technology and Commercial Alleged misconduct: Knew about the plan to replace the board and agreed to go along with his suspension because he was aware that he would be reinstated.

Status of accountability

Arrested, along with his wife and stepdaughters, for corruption, fraud and money laundering pertaining to the Kusile Power Station in October 2022. The case was struck off the roll in November 2023 due to procedural delays.

Dudu Myeni

Dudu Myeni

SAA board chairperson Alleged misconduct: Recommended that Zuma conduct a ‘review’ of Eskom, which was used as a pretext to suspend executives.

Status of accountability

No criminal charges have been brought against her relating to Eskom. She died in 2024.

Story 2Glencore

Summary
Timeline
Key Players
Glencore owned Optimum Coal Holdings (OCH), which controlled Optimum Coal Mine (OCM). OCM had a long history of doing business with Eskom, but the business relationship had become strained and Glencore was struggling financially. The entities entered into negotiations that would benefit them both. The Guptas saw an opportunity but did not have the money to purchase Glencore. Instead, they funnelled money from Eskom to Tegeta – the Gupta’s main mining company – through a series of irregular pre-payments for coal. By purchasing OCH, the Guptas became the owners of two mine rehabilitation trusts called Optimum and Koornfontein, collectively worth R1.75bn.

1993

OCM was owned by Trans-Natal Coal Corporation and Trans-Natal Colliery. It supplied coal to Eskom’s Hendrina Power Station via a railway built to connect the two.

2008

OCH took control of OCM.

2012

Glencore, a huge resource and energy multinational, acquired OCH and, thus, OCM. The quality of coal supplied by OCM to Hendrina has been deteriorating for some time. Eskom’s agreement with the mine protected it from having to pay the same price for poorer quality coal, so OCM was operating at a significant loss by July 2013.

2015

Eskom calculated that OCM was liable for a penalty fee of R2.17bn due to the deterioration in the quality of services rendered. Glencore disputed the fee, and the two entities engaged in a series of negotiations to reach a compromise. By early 2015, they were on track to finding a mutually suitable settlement – this entailed an agreement to suspend the penalty fee but increase the price of the coal to help OCM recoup its costs. Molefe had been appointed Eskom CEO by April 2015, and he was strongly against the settlement agreement.

June: Molefe communicated to OCM that he wanted to terminate the agreement, even if it caused financial losses for OCM. He also declared that OCM would indeed be liable for the R2.17bn penalty fee, due immediately, despite Eskom’s lawyers raising concerns that the amount may not have been calculated correctly.

July: Auditing firm KPMG informed Glencore that an undisclosed buyer was interested in acquiring OCM. When Glencore expressed unease about engaging with an unidentified buyer, the buyer was revealed as the Gupta’s flagship company, Oakbay.

Eskom issued OCM with an official demand for the R2.17bn penalty.

August: OCM and OCH went into business rescue.

September: Ngubane and Molefe pressed the Minister of Mineral Resources, Ngoako Ramatlhodi, to suspend Glencore’s mining licences. When the minister hesitated, Ngubane allegedly became impatient and implied that the instructions had come from Zuma and should not be challenged. Soon after, Zuma removed Ramatlhodi and replaced him with the so-called ‘Gupta minister’, Mosebenzi Zwane. Zwane appointed advisors who were also reportedly Gupta affiliates: Malcolm Mabaso and Kuben Moodley. Molefe, Joel Raphela from the Department of Mineral Resources (DMR), Zwane, Mabaso and Moodley threatened to suspend Glencore’s mining licences. Around this time, Molefe also allegedly intimidated another buyer interested in Glencore, Phembani Group, saying that it would have to pay the R2.17bn penalty if it wished to acquire OCH.

November: Oakbay and the business rescue practitioners at Glencore signed a term sheet to clear the way for Oakbay to acquire OCH. However, the CEO of Glencore South Africa, Clinton Ephron, was summoned to a meeting with Raphela, Koko and representatives of Tegeta. Koko reportedly informed those present that Tegeta would only go ahead with the deal if OCH sold not only OCM but also its other assets, including the valuable Richard’s Bay coal terminal and Koornfontein coal mine. The next day, Ajay Gupta made Ephron an offer to buy OCH for R1bn, but Ephron declined because this would not settle OCH’s debt with the South African banks. The same day, the DMR instructed Glencore to stop its mining activities.

December: Ephron informed Koko that they would be taking OCH out of business rescue, presumably in response to the suspension of its mining licences. Glencore would honour all its original contracts with Eskom until 2018, even though this would mean that Glencore incurred a loss. Koko initially stated that Eskom was happy with this deal.

At the same time, Zwane contacted Glencore’s global CEO, Ivan Glasenberg, and they met in person in Switzerland. Zwane allegedly urged Glasenberg to sell OCH to Tegeta, claiming he was concerned about job losses if OCH closed. Subsequently, a meeting took place between Zwane, Essa, Tony Gupta, Glasenberg and Ephron. Zwane reportedly introduced Essa as one of his advisors and then left the meeting. Those in the meeting agreed that Glencore would sell OCH for R2.15bn and Glencore would contribute additional funds to settle outstanding debt. Zwane boarded a private jet to Delhi where he met with the Guptas before travelling with them to Muscat, where the Guptas allegedly bought him a BMW 7 series.

After successfully convincing Glencore to sell OCH and its accompanying assets, the Guptas needed to find the money to complete the purchase. Koko reportedly told Eskom legal head Suzanne Daniels to approach the DMR for help. Her letter implied that OCM was at risk of being liquidated, which was untrue. To solve the supposed liquidation problem, Eskom suggested transferring mining licences to Tegeta as quickly as possible and buying a year’s worth of coal upfront. Ngubane asked Daniels to draft an urgent round-robin resolution calling for the upfront purchase of the coal to the tune of R1.68bn. Singh, Koko and Daniels from Eskom and Eric Wood and Mohamed Bobat from the company Regiments Capital reportedly made significant contributions to drafting the resolution. The resolution was approved the day after being sent out, one day before Tegeta signed the final purchase agreement with OCH.

Once the agreement was signed, Singh quickly converted approval for the R1.68bn prepayment into a bank guarantee. Ravindra Nath, another Gupta employee at Tegeta, wrote to the Bank of Baroda to inform them that Tegeta now had the funds to complete the purchase. Tegeta presented the confirmation letter from Baroda and the evidence of the Eskom guarantee to OCH’s consortium banks to convince them they were liquid enough to go through with the acquisition. Tegeta did not allow the business rescue practitioners at OCH or the consortium banks to keep a copy of Baroda’s letter. In other words, the consortium banks approved the transaction based on the money that Tegeta presented to them rather than Baroda’s letter and the Eskom guarantee.

2016

In early April, the Guptas and their companies faced the possibility of having their South African bank accounts and businesses, including Tegeta, closed due to reputational concerns. Tegeta needed R600m to complete the OCH purchase. Nath reportedly made a verbal offer to Dr Ayanda Nteta, a former acting director for Eskom’s Fuel Sourcing Division, to purchase coal upfront with certain discounts. This was never formalised in writing and Tegeta did not explain why Eskom should take up the offer. Eskom’s senior employees worked the whole weekend to make the deal happen, and Nteta sent a draft resolution to Daniels to approve a pre-purchase of R500m, which later ballooned to R659m. This resolution was submitted to an urgently convened board Tender Committee meeting and included the motivations for the deal’s urgency, which were allegedly largely fabricated by Daniels. The Zondo Commission found that the minutes had been edited after the fact to make it look like the key issues of the deal had been dealt with. The submission was signed by Singh and Koko during the meeting and payment was made on the same day.

As a result, Tegeta successfully acquired OCH and its accompanying assets. The Guptas had been particularly interested in two mine-rehabilitation trusts called Optimum and Koornfontein, collectively worth R1.75bn. These trusts are typically set aside for the exclusive use of rehabilitation once a mine reaches the end of its life cycle. The Guptas bought these assets partly with state money, and deposited the balance of the trusts into their personal bank accounts.

2017

In March, Tegeta and Eskom settled the penalty that OCH owed to Eskom. The board Tender Committee approved a new penalty amount of R500m, but this was ignored, and Koko, Singh, and Daniels signed a new settlement agreement of R255.4m. This was never sent to the board for approval.

2018

Tegeta, which had until December 2018 to pay the penalty, only started making payments in January 2018, one month before it was placed in business rescue and the Guptas fled the country. When it went into business rescue, Tegeta still owed Eskom R133.7m.

2024

The NPA reached a settlement with Templar Capital’s South African subsidiary, Liberty, in respect of asset forfeiture applications.
Matshela Koko

Matshela Koko

Eskom Acting CEO and Group Executive: Technology and Commercial Alleged misconduct: Involved in helping Tegeta find the funds to purchase Glencore. Informed Glencore that Tegeta would only go ahead with the deal if OCH sold all of its assets, not just OCM. Instructed Daniels to write to the DMR for help in finding Tegeta the backing to purchase OCH – this led to the R1.68bn upfront coal purchase that was converted into a guarantee that Tegeta could draw down on whenever needed. Signed off on the pre-purchase of R659m’s worth of coal from Tegeta and the reduction of the penalty fee for Tegeta from R2.17bn to R255.4m.

Status of accountability

Arrested, along with his wife and stepdaughters, for corruption, fraud and money laundering pertaining to the Kusile Power Station in October 2022. The case was struck off the roll in November 2023 due to procedural delays. The NPA is free to enrol the case again.

Anoj Singh

Anoj Singh

Eskom CFO Alleged misconduct: Helped to draft and sign the resolution to create the guarantee for Tegeta. While encouraging business relations with Tegeta. Admitted to knowing the Guptas were facing the closure of their bank accounts.

Status of accountability

Stripped of his Chartered Accountant status by the South African Institute of Chartered Accountants in 2020. No criminal charges have been brought against him relating to Eskom.

Brian Molefe

Brian Molefe

Eskom Acting CEO Alleged misconduct: Pressured Glencore into selling to Tegeta.

Status of accountability

In July 2022, the Pretoria High Court ordered Molefe to repay over R9.9m obtained illegally from the Eskom Pension and Provident Fund. He petitioned the Supreme Court of Appeal on the matter.

Suzanne Daniels

Suzanne Daniels

Eskom Legal Chief Alleged misconduct: Drafted documents containing fabrications that led to Tegeta acquiring Glencore. Contacted the DMR to help Tegeta find funds to purchase OCH. Drafted documents to justify the upfront pre-purchase of coal worth R1.68bn, leading to the conversion of the payment into a guarantee that Tegeta could draw down on as it pleased. Fabricated reasons to ensure the approval of a second pre-purchase of R500m, which later ballooned to R659m. Involved in ensuring a reduced penalty fee for Tegeta from R2.17bn to R255.4m.

Status of accountability

No charges have been brought against her relating to Eskom.

Ben Ngubane

Dr Ben Ngubane

Eskom Board Chair Alleged misconduct: With Molefe, pressured the Minister of Mineral Resources to suspend Glencore’s mining licences so that Glencore would sell to Tegeta.

Status of accountability

He died in July 2021.

Mosobenzi Zwane

Mosobenzi Zwane

Minister of Mineral Resources Alleged misconduct: Met with Glasenberg in Switzerland to encourage him to sell Glencore to Tegeta. Connected Essa to Glasenberg and Ephron during a meeting in Switzerland so that the parties could organise a final acquisition deal. Accepted gifts of the Guptas.

Status of accountability

No charges have been brought against him relating to Eskom.

gupta

The Guptas

Alleged misconduct: Ajay Gupta made the initial offer to Ephron to buy OCH, which was rejected. Tony Gupta was present at the final negotiations with Glencore’s international and South African CEOs, Glasenberg and Ephron, as well as Essa and Zwane. These negotiations led to Tegeta securing the purchase of Glencore.

Status of accountability

In June 2022, Rajesh and Atul Gupta were arrested in Dubai on criminal charges of money laundering and corruption filed against them in South Africa. In April 2023, the Dubai Appeal Court in the UAE rejected their extradition to face trial in Bloemfontein. The Minister of Justice and Correctional Services has since engaged with the UAE to appeal this ruling.

Salim Essa

Salim Essa

Gupta associate Alleged misconduct: Introduced as one of Zwane’s advisors in the meeting during which a settlement was decided between Tegeta and Glencore. Provided input on the guarantee that allowed Tegeta to draw down on any amount it wished.

Status of accountability

Moved to Dubai but denied doing so to avoid legal processes in South Africa. He filed an application from abroad to have numerous sections of the Zondo Commission’s findings set aside. He is under investigation and the NPA will seek his extradition once he is indicted.

Ayanda Nteta

Dr Ayanda Nteta

Eskom Fuel Sourcing Division Acting Director Alleged misconduct: Promoted the R500m pre-payment – that later ballooned to R659m. Had access to Eskom’s April 2016 Supply Plan, and likely knew that the reason given for this urgent pre-payment – that Arnot Power Station needed coal – was not true.

Status of accountability

She resigned in 2018 before disciplinary proceedings against her could begin. No criminal charges have been brought against her.

Story 3Brakfontein mine

Summary
Timeline
Key Players
Tegeta secured a procurement contract with Eskom for coal from the Guptas’ Brakfontein Mine. Among several issues, the Brakfontein mine’s coal was poor quality and would not burn properly at the power plant. Tegeta and Eskom officials worked together to cover this up by faking coal combustion tests. The deal between Eskom and Brakfontein went through, and the mine’s inferior quality coal severely impacted Eskom’s energy output. When Tegeta went into business rescue in 2018, Eskom incurred significant financial losses.

2011

The Guptas tried to obtain a contract with Eskom for coal from the Tegeta-owned Vierfontein mine, but there were issues with its environmental compliance.

2012

The Guptas tried to obtain a contract with Eskom under various other companies, excluding Tegeta, for coal from their Brakfontein mine, which is situated in Delmas, Mpumalanga. They were unsuccessful because Brakfontein was unsuitable for various reasons, including that it did not have a water licence – a basic requirement for Eskom to consider contracting a mine – and would only obtain one in December 2014.

2014

In May, load shedding allowed Eskom to consider one-to-one bids for contracts – such as Tegeta’s offer to supply coal from Brakfontein – instead of tenders. These offers were supposed to be communicated to Eskom’s Supplier Development Department for vetting, but this did not happen in the case of Brakfontein.

2015

March: After Gupta associates reportedly pressured Eskom to increase the terms of the deal from five years to 10 years, Eskom entered into an agreement with Tegeta that Brakfontein would be paid R3.7bn to supply Eskom with 13.9m tonnes of coal over 10 years between April 2015 and September 2025. The agreement was signed on 10 March. The following day, the four Eskom executives were suspended. Johann Bester, general manager of Fuel Sourcing at Eskom, testified that the signing of the agreement was rushed so that it would precede Koko’s suspension. He also reported that significant pressure had been placed on him by Vusi Mboweni, acting head of Eskom’s Primary Energy Division (PED), to whom he reported, to get the deal sealed. Eskom paid R1.26bn of the R3.7bn to Tegeta.

April: A number of issues made the Brakfontein mine unsuitable for an Eskom contract. Firstly, KPMG provided Eskom with the opinion that Tegeta was not financially sound enough for such a big contract. This assessment was only made after the deal had been agreed upon. Secondly, Tegeta only had mining licences until October 2020 for an agreement that spanned from 2015 to 2025. If Tegeta was unable to renew its licences, it would be unable to provide Eskom with coal from Brakfontein after October 2020. Thirdly, the quality of the coal mined at Brakfontein was deficient. The contract signed on 10 March stipulated that coal mined at Brakfontein had to be subject to a combustion test, which would verify if the coal burned correctly in Eskom’s burners, by the end of the month. This test was never performed, but tests run in 2014 had shown that the quality of the coal was inferior.

May: An amendment was made to the contract to waive the testing requirement. Eskom also moved from SGS Services SA to Sibonisiwe Coal Laboratory Services to test Brakfontein’s coal. Between May and August, Sibonisiwe repeatedly reported that the coal’s quality was inferior.

June: Tegeta offered an extra 200 000 tonnes of coal a month, which would be supplied by Brakfontein Extension. Nteta told Nath that Eskom agreed in principle with the offer but the combustion test was still needed. Email correspondence between Nath, Nteta and Tony Gupta showed that Nath advised Nteta to remove this clause so that the deal would go through. A new letter was drafted that excluded the provision about the combustion test.

July: Dr Mark van der Riet, a coal specialist and acting manager of the PED, was asked to help PED manage coal supplies. His staff reportedly told him their concerns about the quality of the coal they were receiving from Brakfontein – around 50% was being rejected because of its inferior quality.

August: A senior employee at Tegeta, Jacques Roux, complained to Koko about Sibonisiwe repeatedly failing the coal. The director of Sibonisiwe, Sibonisiwe Masuku, testified that he experienced intimidation and threats from Koko about his company failing the coal. Gert Opperman, an Eskom contract manager, was also reportedly placed under enormous pressure by Koko to get the Majuba power station to accept poor-quality coal.

After a final set of tests was sent to Koko showing that the coal’s quality was subpar, Koko ordered that another sample be taken. He reportedly prevented van der Riet and his colleague from witnessing the testing and then told them that the testing had been cancelled. However, the following day Koko had a new report claiming that the quality of the coal was acceptable. Koko allegedly told van der Riet to hand over a file that contained CCTV footage and an affidavit documenting how Roux and a colleague forced their way into the offices to confront the staff about the test results. Koko ordered the suspension of coal supplies from Brakfontein but lifted the suspension five days later.

September: On 1 September, van der Riet gave the file with the CCTV footage and affidavit to Mboweni, who reported to Koko. During this meeting, Mboweni handed van der Riet a letter from Koko suspending him and three of his colleagues.

October: Koko declared that the quality testing issue had been resolved and the testing would now happen at the Kendal Power Station Laboratory. At the time, the Kendal laboratory at Eskom did not have the requisite independent certification to complete such tests. Kendal only failed 3% of Tegeta’s coal between October 2015 and the end of the contract (Tegeta’s closure in 2018).

2016

In August, Vuyisile Ncube from coal operations at Eskom made a submission to the board Tender Committee for the procurement of a further R2.9bn worth of coal from the Brakfontein Extension. Treasury rejected the application based on the quality of the coal from the Extension.

2018

Tegeta went into business rescue and stopped providing coal to Eskom. The suddenness of this caught Eskom off guard, and it did not have enough time to find an alternative supplier. Tegeta should have been subject to non-performance penalties of R531m, which was never paid.
Matshela Koko

Matshela Koko

Eskom Group executive: Technology and commercial; Acting CEO Koko and Singh prepared a submission that was supposed to lead to the appointment of McKinsey for eight months of work for R101m. The Zondo Commission noted that all the services could have been provided internally by Eskom's treasury and financial management units. Koko apparently showed up at work one day with a list of Eskom projects and revenues for each project. This greatly resembled the kinds of lists put together at Regiments so that the company could estimate the revenue it generated from various projects. In other words, Koko was receiving instructions from Regiments about contracts that would be taken up by Regiments and how much money they would make.
Status of accountability
Facing corruption charges for his role in ensuring that ABB (a Swedish-Swiss robotics company) was awarded a tender at Eskom’s Kusile project in 2015.
Salim Essa

Salim Essa

Essa left Regiments along with Eric Wood to form Trillian. When Regiments fell away and Trillian replaced it, Trillian invoiced Eskom for R30.6m for work related to this contract that was executed by only two Trillian employees. Eskom ended up paying Trillian R700m in connection with the MSA even after McKinsey had rejected any association with the company based on Essa's reputation as a 'politically exposed person'. Essa's wife's company, Zestilor, was linked to Koko's dealings with Regiments.
Status of accountability
Essa moved to Dubai and denies moving to avoid subjecting himself to further legal processes in South Africa. He filed an application from abroad last year to have numerous sections of the findings from the commission set aside. It is reliably understood that he is under active investigation and that the NPA will seek his extradition once he is indicted.
Anoj Singh

Anoj Singh

Eskom CFO Under Molefe and Singh's guidance, McKinsey and Regiments were awarded two large contracts with Eskom. Koko and Singh prepared a submission that they presented to the board on the Eskom Corporate Plan contract. The board agreed to appoint McKinsey for eight months of work for R101m. Trillian invoiced Eskom for R30.6m for work related to this contract that was executed by only two Trillian employees. Tebogo Leballo, Trillian's financial director, sent the invoice to Singh. Eskom paid Trillian R30.6m on 14 April 2016. Eskom's Steering Committee (Steerco) convened for a meeting chaired by Singh during which Singh raised concerns over the awarding of the MSA contract to McKinsey on a sole-source basis because McKinsey was thwarting his and others' plans. Steerco agreed with Singh and terminated the contract with McKinsey. Eskom began negotiating a final fee to pay McKinseyThe settlement equalled R1.8bn. McKinsey received R1.1bn in total and Trillian received R700m.
Status of accountability
Faces charges related to his corrupt role at Transnet but no charges have been brought against him yet pertaining to Eskom. Stripped of his CA status by the South African Institute of Chartered Accountants.
Brian Molefe

Brian Molefe

Eskom Acting CEO Under Molefe and Singh's guidance, McKinsey and Regiments were awarded two large contracts with Eskom.
Status of accountability
In July 2022, the Pretoria High Court ordered Molefe to repay over R9.9million obtained illegally from the Eskom Pension and Provident Fund. He petitioned the Supreme Court of Appeal on the matter.

Story 4McKinsey, Regiments and Trillian

Summary
Timeline
Key Players
Despite never signing an official contract with the global consulting firm, Eskom paid McKinsey R1.1bn for a Turnaround Strategy/Master Services Agreement (MSA) contract. Eskom had the internal capacity to do some of the work it paid McKinsey for. McKinsey subcontracted private equity firm, Regiments Capital, but Salim Essa, a Gupta associate, broke away from Regiments to form Trillian with Eric Wood. McKinsey rejected Trillian because of its association with Essa. However, Trillian managed to get Eskom to pay it R700m in relation to the retracted agreement between McKinsey and Eskom. A different agreement (the Corporate Plan contract) between McKinsey and Eskom earned Trillian R30.6m for work that was performed by Regiments.

2014

Through Colin Matjila, the acting group CEO of Eskom, and Salim Essa, Regiments was awarded a contract with Eskom for R1m in 2014. Following this, McKinsey sent several unsolicited proposals to Eskom offering to expand an existing programme it had designed for Eskom called the ‘Top Engineers Programme’. Eskom declined due to budgetary constraints.

2015

April: Essa and Gupta ally Kuben Moodley reportedly continued to press Eskom for contracts. Regiments joined forces with McKinsey as its Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) partner. McKinsey and Regiments presented a joint offer to build an internal consulting unit at Eskom. This offer was submitted on the same day that Molefe transferred from Transnet to Eskom as acting group CEO.

May: Molefe and Singh broached the possibility of a turnaround project larger than the Top Engineers Programme with McKinsey, termed interchangeably the ‘Turnaround Strategy’ or ‘MSA’. Singh had not yet been transferred to Eskom but was already participating in negotiations with McKinsey and, before he started working at Eskom, had allegedly provided advice to the consulting companies on how best to present their proposals to Eskom.

A submission to the board proposed McKinsey as the sole service provider of the Turnaround Strategy and no open tender process was pursued. Eskom executives maintained that McKinsey was uniquely positioned to deliver its services because it had a history of engaging with Eskom on the Top Engineers Programme.

Establishing the details of this MSA went ahead before Eskom and McKinsey had signed the contract. The conditions of the MSA were highly irregular: it concluded that, on an at-risk basis, McKinsey and Regiments would be paid a percentage of the savings that their work generated for Eskom over a three-year period with no cap on this amount. McKinsey would receive 70% and Regiments would receive 30%. This is unlawful under the Public Finance Management Act (1999), which stipulates that consultants must be appointed on a fixed-fee basis. Any deviations from this stipulation must be applied for in writing to the National Treasury. Molefe approved the submission for the MSA.

July: Returning from his short suspension, Koko allegedly engaged with Essa in secret about the MSA. Koko worked with a list of entities or transactions that he reportedly told Suzanne Daniels had come from his ‘principals’. This list resembled those drafted at Regiments, which allowed the company to estimate the revenue it generated from various projects. In other words, Koko was probably being told about contracts that could make their way to Regiments and how much money they would make for Regiments. On this list, there was a hand-written note by Koko referencing Zestilor, a Gupta-owned company run by Essa’s wife.

August: A second contract called the Corporate Plan was being drafted so that Eskom could contract McKinsey for ‘urgent finance work’.

September: Koko and Singh presented a submission to the Eskom board on the Corporate Plan contract. The board agreed to appoint McKinsey for eight months of work worth R101m. It has been reported that no competitive tender process was pursued and a senior Eskom employee testified that these financial services could have been provided by Eskom’s internal team.

October: The board Tender Committee approved a submission that Eskom could conclude the negotiations around the MSA. The submission also requested approval for a R475m down payment to be made to McKinsey even though a budget had not been finalised by McKinsey nor had it rendered any services to Eskom.

December: Eskom executives ignored the fact that approval to appoint McKinsey on a sole-source and at-risk basis had not been sought nor secured from the National Treasury. They sent an acceptance letter on the MSA to McKinsey, who accepted it. The letter included the condition that if the National Treasury was unhappy with the contract, the two parties would renegotiate its terms. This strategy to circumvent the lack of approval from the National Treasury was reportedly misleading and unintelligible.

2016

January: Despite only an acceptance letter, and with no formal contract in place, McKinsey began work for the MSA. Regiments was not yet formally part of the arrangement, but the plan was for McKinsey to nominate Regiments as a supplier development partner.

February: Wood left Regiments to form Trillian with Essa, and they wanted Trillian to take over Regiments’ role in the outsourced work for the MSA.

March: McKinsey formally rejected Trillian as a partner after conducting a due diligence. It cited Essa’s alleged reputation as a ‘politically exposed person’ as one of the reasons. Trillian nevertheless invoiced Eskom R30.6m for work that was executed by Regiments and not Trillian. Tebogo Leballo, Trillian’s financial director, sent the invoice to Singh claiming that Trillian was a small business that was experiencing cash flow problems. Trillian wanted to be paid directly by Eskom instead of waiting to be paid by McKinsey, who had appointed Trillian as its partner. This was untrue and Trillian had no business with Eskom.

McKinsey rendered services for only six of the eight month contract but was paid R78.6m.

April: Eskom paid Trillian R30.6m for the Corporate Plan contract that had been invoiced the previous month.

June: The allegedly captured officials at Eskom were unhappy about McKinsey rejecting Trillian. Eskom’s Steering Committee (Steerco) convened a meeting chaired by Singh, during which he raised concerns over awarding the MSA contract to McKinsey on a sole-source basis. Steerco agreed with Singh and terminated the contract with McKinsey. Eskom negotiated a final fee of R1.8bn to pay McKinsey. The Eskom executives did not provide a breakdown for how they reached the settlement value, and they reportedly used an inflated price of R2.84bn to mislead and instil fear among the board Tender Committee members, who were relieved that a lower fee of R1.8bn had been reached.

August: Eskom began making payments to McKinsey and Trillian regarding the cancelled MSA agreement.

December: Oliver Wyman & Marsh international consultants advised Eskom to withhold payments to McKinsey and Trillian. They were concerned about how the fees had been calculated and the legality of the contracts. They encouraged Eskom to seek legal advice. This was ignored and the payments continued until February 2017.

2017

In February, McKinsey received R1.1bn in total and Trillian received R700m as McKinsey’s BBBEE partner, despite the fact that McKinsey had openly rejected Trillian. McKinsey received ten times more than it had ever earned from Eskom. While Singh, Molefe and Koko were reportedly central to the corrupt awarding of the MSA and Corporate Plan contracts, Edwin Mabelane (the Chief Procurement Officer), Prish Govender (a senior financial executive) and Suzanne Daniels were also allegedly involved.
Matshela Koko

Matshela Koko

Eskom Acting CEO and Group Executive: Technology and Commercial Alleged misconduct: Together with Singh, reportedly prepared a submission that led to the appointment of McKinsey for eight months of work for R101m, despite the fact that the services could have been provided internally by Eskom’s treasury and financial management units.

Status of accountability

Arrested, along with his wife and stepdaughters, for corruption, fraud and money laundering in October 2022 pertaining to the Kusile Power Station. The case was struck off the roll in November 2023 due to procedural delays. The NPA is free to enrol the case again.

Salim Essa

Salim Essa

Trillian director and Gupta associate Alleged misconduct: Left Regiments to form Trillian with Eric Wood. Trillian invoiced Eskom for R30.6m of work for the Corporate Plan contract that was allegedly not executed by Trillian. Eskom paid Trillian R700m in connection with the MSA contract even after McKinsey had rejected any association with the company. Essa’s wife’s company, Zestilor, was reportedly linked to Koko’s dealings with Regiments.

Status of accountability

Essa moved to Dubai but denies moving to avoid further legal processes in South Africa. He filed an application from abroad to have numerous sections of the Zondo Commission findings set aside. He is under active investigation and the NPA will seek his extradition once he is indicted.

Anoj Singh

Anoj Singh

Eskom CFO Alleged misconduct: Under his and Molefe’s guidance, McKinsey and Regiments were awarded two large contracts with Eskom. Eskom reportedly paid Trillian R30.6m for work done by Regiments. He raised concerns at a Steerco meeting over awarding the MSA contract to McKinsey on a sole-source basis because McKinsey was allegedly thwarting his and others’ plans. Steerco terminated the contract with McKinsey. The settlement fee agreed by Eskom and McKinsey was R1.8bn – McKinsey received R1.1bn in total and Trillian received R700m.

Status of accountability

Stripped of his Chartered Accountant status by the South African Institute of Chartered Accountants in 2020. No criminal charges have been brought against him relating to Eskom.

Brian Molefe

Brian Molefe

Eskom acting CEO Alleged misconduct: Under his and Singh’s guidance, McKinsey and Regiments were awarded two large contracts with Eskom.

Status of accountability

In July 2022, the Pretoria High Court ordered him to repay over R9.9m obtained illegally from the Eskom Pension and Provident Fund. He petitioned the Supreme Court of Appeal on the matter.

Eric Wood

Eric Wood

Trillian founder Alleged misconduct: Trillian invoiced Eskom for R30.6m of work for the Corporate Plan contract that was reportedly not executed by Trillian. Eskom paid Trillian R700m in connection with the MSA contract even after McKinsey had rejected any association with the company.

Status of accountability

No criminal charges have been brought against him relating to Eskom.

Story 5Kusile Power Station

Summary
Timeline
Key Players
Swedish-Swiss robotics company Asea Brown Boveri (ABB) colluded with Koko so that ABB’s South African arm (ZAABB) would be awarded an Eskom contract to the value of R2.2bn. Koko’s stepdaughter’s company was irregularly appointed as a subcontractor in the ABB-Eskom deal, earning Koko and his family significant kickbacks. The Leago Group was also irregularly appointed as a subcontractor.

2008

The Kusile Power Station project, which aims to build one of the world’s largest coal-fired power plants, began in 2008 and is ongoing. It is located in Mpumalanga.

2013

Eskom was looking to contract for the Control and Instrumentation (C&I) aspect of the Kusile project, which would entail setting up a system to monitor the power-generating units of the plant from a centralised computer network. Senior managers at ZAABB reportedly actively pursued Koko to ensure they won the contract from Eskom. Former ABB Africa Business Unit manager, Götz Dietrich Wolff, who turned state’s witness, reported that Markus Bruegmann instructed his team to contact Koko to move ahead on obtaining the C&I contract. Siemens was also in the running for the tender.

2014

Dr Thabo Mokwena – an associate and friend of Koko and owner of the Leago Group – was introduced to Wolff as a potential partner by Bruegmann. The Leago Group could be subcontracted as a social development and localisation partner, which would increase the price of the contract by more than R130m. When the deal went though, Mokwena allegedly went back on his word and did not pay Koko his share of the deal.

Sunil Vip, an employee of ZAABB, was allegedly providing the company with crucial insider information from Eskom.

2015

ZAABB was awarded the contract with Eskom, valued at R2.2bn.

May: The Leago Group officially entered into an agreement with ZAABB as a subcontractor.

April: An advance payment was made following the signing of the ZAABB-Eskom contract.

December: Vip reportedly advised ZAABB to present a proposal of no more than R2.2bn. ZAABB decided to subcontract Impulse International, despite its poor scores in procurement tests and lack of relevant qualifications. Koko’s stepdaughter, Koketso Aren (née Choma), became a significant shareholder in the company after it was awarded the contract. The reported value of the subcontract ranges, but the Daily Maverick puts the total amount paid by ZAABB to Impulse at R543.5m, of which R24m was used to reward individuals and entities with kickbacks. Koko and his family accessed their kickbacks through front companies.

Two former employees of ZAABB, Mohammed Mooidheen and Vernon Pillay, along with their wives, allegedly benefited from kickbacks for their complicity in the scheme. The reports on the exact value of the kickbacks varies, although it has been reported that Mohammed and Raeesa Mooidheen received several million in cash and significant funding from Impulse to purchase a Mercedes Benz AMG and Volkswagen Gold VII. Vernon and Aradhna Pillay reportedly received several million in cash and significant funding from Impulse to help purchase a Toyota Land Cruiser.

2020

Following an investigation conducted by the SIU, ABB entered into an agreement to pay Eskom back R1.58bn.
Matshela Koko

Matshela Koko

Eskom Group executive: Technology and commercial; Acting CEO Alleged misconduct: Reportedly acted as ZAABB’s insider at Eskom. He allegedly involved the business of one of his friends, Mokwena, as a subcontracted partner so that he could earn a kickback. ZAABB also irregularly subcontracted Impulse International, a company in which Koko’s stepdaughter had significant shares. Koko and his family allegedly received irregular payments via front companies from Impulse.
Status of accountability
Arrested, along with his wife and stepdaughters, for corruption, fraud and money laundering in October 2022 pertaining to the Kusile Power Station. The case was struck off the roll in November 2023 due to procedural delays. The NPA is free to enrol the case again.
Koketso Aren

Koketso Aren née Choma

Impulse director and stepdaughter of Matshela Koko Alleged misconduct: Reportedly bought significant shares in and became a director of Impulse after it secured a subcontract from ZAABB. The money was paid by Impulse to front companies and then to the Koko family members.
Status of accountability
Faced charges of corruption, fraud and money laundering. The case was struck off the roll in November 2023 due to procedural delays. The NPA is free to enrol the case again.
Thabo Mokwena

Dr Thabo Mokwena

Leago Group chairman Alleged misconduct: Friends with Koko, who allegedly helped Mokwena’s company Leago secure a subcontracting deal with ZAABB.
Status of accountability

No charges have been brought against him.

Markus Bruegmann

Markus Bruegmann

ABB senior executive and German citizen Alleged misconduct: Reportedly instructed his team to contact Koko to move ahead with obtaining the C&I contract.
Status of accountability
Resigned as CEO of Rock Tech Lithium when corruption allegations surfaced in connection to the Kusile Power Station. Charged in absentia with corruption, fraud and money laundering linked to Kusile. An Interpol red notice has been issued against him.
Sunil Vip

Sunil Vip

ABB senior employee and German citizen Alleged misconduct: Provided ZAABB with insider information from Eskom.
Status of accountability
Charged in absentia with corruption, fraud and money laundering linked to the Kusile Power Station. An Interpol red notice has been issued against him.
Dietrich Wolff

Götz Dietrich Wolff

ABB Africa business unit manager Alleged misconduct: Reported on Bruegmann’s attempts to make contact with Koko and secure the tender.
Status of accountability
Turned state witness.
Mohammed Mooidheen

Mohammed Mooidheen

ZAABB senior employee Alleged misconduct: Along with his wife, Raeesa Mooidheen, allegedly received significant kickbacks for his complicity in awarding the irregular Impulse contract.
Status of accountability
He and his wife face charges of corruption, money laundering, fraud and forgery. The Asset Forfeiture Unit of the NPA secured a R583.8m restraint order against him in April 2023.
Vernon Pillay

Vernon Pillay

ZAABB senior employee Alleged misconduct: Along with his wife, Aradhna Pillay, allegedly received significant kickbacks for his complicity in awarding the irregular Impulse contract.
Status of accountability
He and his wife face charges of corruption, money laundering, fraud and forgery. The AFU of the NPA secured a R583.8m restraint order against him in April 2023.

Story 6Huarong Energy Africa

Summary
Timeline
Key Players
Sean Maritz and Anoj Singh attempted to secure a US$21.8m contract with Huarong Energy Africa (HEA) but the head of Eskom’s Treasury, André Pillay, and the National Treasury put a stop to the deal. HEA wanted to provide Eskom with loan and financing provisions. HEA’s parent company, based in China, created its South African subsidiary specifically to make this deal happen. HEA had no assets of its own.

2017

March: Singh told Pillay that HEA wanted to move the deal forward with Eskom signing a term sheet that set out the nature of the transaction, the fees that would be paid and other matters. Singh wanted to remove a clause that would make the agreement non-binding. Singh allegedly did not consult Eskom’s legal department on the matter. HEA would be due a large payment of fees upon initiation of the deal if the clause stated that the term sheet was binding. Singh left Eskom before the deal concluded but the new CEO, Maritz, continued with the proposal.

November: Based on signing the term sheet, HEA invoiced Eskom US$21.8m. Pillay blocked the payment.

December: Maritz agreed to sign an asset loan framework agreement with HEA, which allowed HEA to resubmit an invoice. Pillay approached the director general of the National Treasury, Dondo Mogajane, which led to a revocation of the deals’ approval.

Sean Maritz

Sean Maritz

Eskom acting CEO Alleged misconduct: Followed through with Singh’s plans to attempt to secure an allegedly irregular contract with HEA. He was also accused of hiring a friend at Eskom, without revealing the nature of their relationship, to whom he paid a R100 000 monthly salary.
Status of accountinility
Resigned from Eskom before disciplinary measures could be taken. No charges have been brought against him.
Anoj Singh

Anoj Singh

Eskom CFO Alleged misconduct: Allegedly initiated irregular dealings with HEA.
Status of accountinility
Stripped of his Chartered Accountant status by the South African Institute of Chartered Accountants in 2020. No criminal charges have been brought against him relating to Eskom.

RecentCase Updates

Latest developments from news sources
  • Contracts relating to coal supply from Brakfontein, Optimum coal mine and Koornfontein have been set aside. Proceedings have been launched against Tegeta and their Business Rescue Practioners for relief against damages to the value of R724m. Proceedings against certain Eskom executives and directors and private individuals have been instituted for the recovery of R3.8bn. The SIU, Eskom and other authorities are seeking the former Eskom directors to be declared delinquent.
  • Eskom terminated the irregular contracts with ABB. A settlement agreement of R1.577m was reached, which ABB has repaid. In addition, the Independent Directorate has issued ABB with a reparations fine of R2.5bn.
  • Eskom and Impulse International: Eskom cancelled the Impulse International contracts, but a lawsuit has ensued as Impulse claim for damages as a result of the early termination.

Public Impact

Eskom’s already precarious finances deteriorated to the point of requiring a bail-out of R254 billion starting from 2023. This drove the national fiscus into deep debt.

The Guptas reduced the health and pension benefits of OCM workers. After the business collapsed, miners no longer had money to afford medical care and chronic medication. Many died from mining-related illnesses.
After Tegeta was placed under business rescue, OCM retrenched 400 miners. Their cars and homes were repossessed and many became too poor to afford food.