ISS Analysis

State capture demonstrated that corruption can become more than a series of individual criminal acts. It can affect appointment processes, procurement systems, governance structures, financial controls and entire institutional cultures.

Conventional criminal investigation and prosecution remain essential, but they generally focus on identifying criminal conduct and establishing individual or corporate responsibility. They are less well suited to correcting the administrative, governance and organisational conditions that allow corrupt networks to operate repeatedly.

The OPI proposal attempts to address this gap. A systemic audit could, for example, identify procurement controls, appointment practices or information systems that repeatedly create opportunities for corruption even where the evidence is insufficient to prosecute particular individuals.

An institution able to investigate these weaknesses, make binding remedial recommendations and monitor implementation could therefore complement criminal accountability by reducing opportunities for future corruption.

Institutional independence is equally important. Anti-corruption bodies may be required to investigate senior officials, political office holders and powerful institutions. Their effectiveness consequently depends on protection from political interference, secure leadership and adequate resources.

The OPI debate therefore concerns both what powers South Africa’s anti-corruption institutions require and how those institutions should be protected from the very interests they may need to investigate.

NACAC recommends legislation establishing a permanent and independent Office of Public Integrity and Anti-Corruption.

Its proposed mandate is to prevent, investigate and remedy systemic corruption involving government and other organs of state and to enhance transparency and integrity in their operations.

The proposed functions include:

• Identifying and monitoring corruption risk;
• Collecting and analysing relevant data;
• Conducting systemic audits;
• Convening inquiries and public hearings;
• Undertaking civil investigations;
• Protecting public property and recovering assets;
• Developing binding remedial measures;
• Advising government on policy, legislation and integrity standards;
• Coordinating implementation of the National Anti-Corruption Strategy;
• Receiving and referring whistleblower disclosures;
• Coordinating whistleblower protection and support;
• Conducting public education and social mobilisation; and
• Cooperating with domestic and international agencies.

NACAC also proposes significant investigatory powers. These include summonsing witnesses, requiring production of records, undertaking inspections, applying for search and seizure warrants and obtaining access to restricted information subject to legislation.

The OPI would be able to institute civil proceedings to preserve and recover public property and proceeds associated with corruption. It could also issue binding remedial action following systemic audits or investigations and approach a court to enforce that action.

Criminal conduct identified during OPI work would be referred to the appropriate criminal justice institution. NACAC also proposes that the OPI should be able, under the explicit direction of an assigned NPA prosecutor, to collect criminal evidence and prepare a docket for further investigation or prosecution.

NACAC recommends establishing the OPI under Chapter 9 of the Constitution. It proposes a governing council of between five and nine members appointed by the President following recommendation by the National Assembly after an open and participatory process.

Recognising that constitutional amendment may be difficult, NACAC proposes an enhanced statutory body as a fallback rather than its preferred final model.

During the transition, NACAC proposes using the SIU as the precursor to the OPI. The SIU would be authorised to begin performing functions capable of implementation under existing or amended legislation, before ultimately being absorbed into the new institution.

These remain NACAC recommendations. Government has not yet published its own detailed institutional proposal or enabling legislation.

• Lead department: Department of Justice and Constitutional Development.
• Originating policy institution: National Anti-Corruption Advisory Council (NACAC), whose term ended in August 2025 after submitting its final recommendations.
• Political lead: President of the Republic and Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development.
• Primary transitional institution: Special Investigating Unit (SIU), which NACAC proposes should provide the operational foundation for the OPI and ultimately be absorbed into it.
• Relevant criminal justice actors: National Prosecuting Authority (NPA); Investigating Directorate Against Corruption (IDAC); Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (DPCI); South African Police Service (SAPS); Asset Forfeiture Unit (AFU).
• Other relevant integrity institutions: Public Protector; Financial Intelligence Centre; South African Revenue Service; Public Service Commission; Auditor-General South Africa and other regulators and oversight institutions whose mandates intersect with systemic corruption.
• Legislative and constitutional actors: Parliament, particularly the Portfolio Committee on Justice and Constitutional Development, and ultimately the National Assembly and National Council of Provinces if constitutional or enabling legislation is introduced.
• Civil society and policy actors: Anti-corruption organisations, whistleblower organisations, organised business, professional bodies and research organisations participating in the consultation over the future institutional architecture.

• Constitutional design: Establishing a new Chapter 9 institution requires constitutional amendment. Government must decide whether to pursue NACAC’s preferred constitutionally entrenched model or another statutory arrangement.
• Institutional independence: Independence depends on more than formal status. Appointment, removal, funding, reporting, staffing and operational control arrangements must protect the institution against political interference while maintaining accountability.
• Transition from the SIU: Absorbing the SIU would involve significant legislative, organisational, personnel and financial changes. Ongoing investigations and civil proceedings must continue without disruption.
• Mandate overlap: The OPI’s civil investigation, asset recovery, whistleblower, corruption intelligence and remedial functions could overlap with existing institutions unless responsibilities are precisely defined.
• Criminal enforcement relationship: NACAC leaves prosecution with the NPA and criminal investigative responsibility largely within the existing criminal justice system. The division between OPI systemic investigations and criminal cases will require clear referral and case management arrangements.
• Asset recovery: Expanded OPI recovery powers must be reconciled with the AFU, POCA, the Special Tribunal and any future expansion of the SIU’s forfeiture powers.
• Presidential proclamations and own initiative investigations: NACAC proposes that OPI civil investigations could arise either from presidential proclamations or on the institution’s own initiative where there is reasonable suspicion of systemic corruption. The final balance between these mechanisms will be important for institutional independence.
• Binding remedial action: Strong remedial powers could make the OPI effective in addressing institutional weaknesses, but they require fair procedures, clear jurisdiction and access to judicial review.
• Funding: The OPI would require substantial and predictable resources. Expansion from the SIU model into prevention, public inquiries, systemic audits, whistleblower support and national coordination would materially increase staffing and budget requirements.
• Specialist capability: The proposed model requires expertise in investigations, forensic accounting, procurement, organisational governance, data analysis, behavioural science, public administration, asset recovery and whistleblower support.
• Whistleblower architecture: The OPI proposal and the Protected Disclosures Bill need to be aligned so that responsibility for receiving disclosures, referral, legal support, physical protection and financial assistance is clear.

• Publication of a formal government response to NACAC’s OPI recommendations.
• Cabinet’s decision on the institutional model for the future anti-corruption body.
• Whether government adopts NACAC’s preferred Chapter 9 model or pursues a different statutory structure.
• The extent to which the future government proposal follows NACAC’s systemic corruption and prevention model rather than creating a more conventional criminal enforcement agency.
• The meaning of Minister Kubayi’s September 2026 call for a multidisciplinary investigative and prosecutorial anti-corruption agency and whether prosecutorial functions are incorporated into the eventual design.
• The final division of responsibility between the OPI, NPA, IDAC and DPCI.
• The OPI’s proposed asset preservation, civil recovery and remedial powers and their relationship with the AFU and POCA.
• Alignment between the OPI proposal and the Protected Disclosures Bill, particularly responsibility for whistleblower protection and support.
• Appointment, removal, budget and reporting mechanisms intended to secure institutional independence.
• The role of presidential proclamations in triggering investigations and the extent of any independent own-initiative investigative power.
• Funding and organisational planning for transferring and expanding the SIU’s capabilities.

The OPI proposal is now considerably more developed than it was when NACAC first advanced the idea. The Council’s final report and detailed recommendations set out a substantive institutional model covering mandate, powers, governance, transition, asset recovery, whistleblower functions and constitutional status.

The political process has also advanced. The President has formally committed government to finalising its approach, has tasked the Justice Minister with processing the NACAC recommendations, and the Minister now describes herself as responsible for implementing them.

This should not, however, be confused with a final government decision to establish the OPI in the form proposed by NACAC. No enabling Bill or constitutional amendment has been published, Cabinet has not publicly adopted the detailed NACAC model and the Justice Minister continues to invite views on the future institution’s shape and form.

Indeed, the September 2026 ministerial statements suggest that an important design debate remains open. NACAC proposes an institution centred on prevention, systemic and civil investigation, remediation and public integrity, with criminal prosecution remaining with the NPA. The Minister has more recently spoken of the need for a multidisciplinary investigative and prosecutorial anti-corruption agency. Whether these approaches are ultimately reconciled could determine the direction of the reform.

The constitutional question will also be decisive. A Chapter 9 institution would offer the strongest formal protection for independence but would require constitutional amendment and broad parliamentary support. A statutory institution could be created more easily but would need sufficiently strong safeguards to meet constitutional requirements for an adequately independent anti-corruption capability.

The proposal therefore stands at a significant transition point. It has moved beyond an advisory concept but has not yet become a settled government legislative programme. The next major milestone will be publication of government’s chosen institutional model and the legislation required to give effect to it.