ISS Analysis

The SIU occupies a distinctive position in South Africa’s anti-corruption system. Unlike conventional criminal investigative bodies, its principal focus is investigating maladministration and unlawful conduct connected to state institutions and using civil proceedings to recover losses and reverse unlawful transactions.

This allows the SIU to pursue accountability without waiting for the completion of a criminal prosecution. It can seek to set aside unlawful contracts, recover state losses and prevent further financial harm while criminal evidence is separately referred to law enforcement and prosecuting authorities.

The Special Tribunal has become an important mechanism for this work because it provides a specialised forum for civil litigation arising from SIU investigations.

The effectiveness of this model nevertheless depends on the SIU having appropriate remedial powers, sufficient resources and clear institutional relationships with prosecutorial, law enforcement and asset recovery bodies.

The draft amendment Bill has not been published, so its precise clauses cannot yet be assessed. The most authoritative public description remains the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development’s parliamentary reply of 3 December 2025.

According to the Minister’s December 2025 description, the draft proposes amendments concerning:

• Revisions to the statutory provisions governing the establishment and functioning of the existing Special Tribunal;
• Additional functions of the SIU;
• Issuance of SIU reports;
• Remedial action;
• Funding of the SIU;
• The nature of proceedings before the Special Tribunal;
• Preservation and forfeiture of the proceeds of unlawful activities;
• Appointment of a curator bonis; and
• Administrative sanctions.

These areas suggest a reform package considerably broader than technical amendments. They could affect the SIU’s institutional powers, financial sustainability, relationship with the Special Tribunal and ability to preserve and recover assets.

The actual scope will remain uncertain until the draft Bill is published or introduced in Parliament.

• Lead department: Department of Justice and Constitutional Development.
• Originating institution: Special Investigating Unit (SIU).
• Political lead: Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development.
• Relevant system actors: National Prosecuting Authority (NPA); Asset Forfeiture Unit (AFU); Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC); Special Tribunal.
• Policy and advisory actors: The Presidency; National Anti-Corruption Advisory Council (NACAC); Parliament.
• Potential future institutional interactions: Any expansion of the SIU’s remedial, asset preservation or forfeiture powers will require coordination with the NPA and AFU and may also need to be aligned with proposals for a new Office of Public Integrity and Anti-Corruption.

• Funding sustainability: The SIU’s reliance partly on cost recovery from state institutions can create financial instability, particularly where institutions under investigation fail or delay payment.
• Institutional overlap: Expanded remedial, sanctioning or asset recovery powers could overlap with functions exercised by the NPA, AFU and other enforcement bodies.
• Special Tribunal design: Amendments must respond carefully to Constitutional Court jurisprudence confirming that the Special Tribunal is not a court while recognising its powers under the SIU Act.
• Due process: Administrative sanctions and stronger remedial powers would require clear procedures, fair hearing protections and mechanisms for review or appeal.
• Asset preservation: New preservation and forfeiture mechanisms must be coordinated with POCA and existing asset recovery institutions.
• Implementation of referrals: SIU findings frequently require action by departments, disciplinary authorities, regulatory bodies or prosecutors. Legislative reform cannot by itself ensure that these institutions act promptly.
• Dependence on presidential proclamations: The SIU generally acts within terms of reference contained in presidential proclamations. Delays or narrowly framed proclamations can affect the speed and scope of investigations.
• Specialist capacity: Expanded powers would require corresponding investigative, forensic, legal and financial expertise.
• Institutional coordination: Effective consequence management requires close working relationships with the NPA, police, Financial Intelligence Centre, South African Revenue Service, regulators and state institutions.
• Leadership and organisational continuity: The transition from Advocate Andy Mothibi to Leonard Lekgetho creates an opportunity for continuity, but implementation of legislative reform will require sustained institutional leadership.

• Publication of the draft SIU Amendment Bill and the start of formal public consultation.
• Cabinet approval and introduction of the Bill in Parliament.
• The final scope of the proposed amendments, particularly provisions dealing with administrative sanctions, asset preservation and forfeiture, funding and additional SIU functions.
• The legislative response to Constitutional Court jurisprudence on the status and powers of the Special Tribunal.
• Reform of the SIU’s funding model and measures to reduce its dependence on fee recovery from state institutions.
• The extent of any new SIU powers to enforce or monitor remedial action following investigations.
• The division of responsibility between the SIU, NPA and AFU for asset preservation and forfeiture.
• Alignment of an expanded SIU mandate with the proposed Office of Public Integrity and Anti-Corruption and wider reforms to South Africa’s anti-corruption architecture.
• Procedural and judicial safeguards accompanying any new administrative sanctioning, preservation or forfeiture powers.

The SIU amendment process is more advanced than a purely conceptual reform because a draft Bill has been developed within the executive and its principal areas of proposed amendment have been publicly identified. It has, however, not yet progressed to a publicly available Bill or formal parliamentary process.

The reform also concerns an institution that is already operationally significant. The challenge is therefore not to create a new anti-corruption capability, but to strengthen an existing institution without disrupting functions that are already producing civil recovery and accountability outcomes.

Funding is likely to be one of the most consequential elements of the eventual legislation. Parliament’s concerns in May 2026 indicate that the current model may constrain staffing and operations even as the SIU is expected to deliver increasingly ambitious recovery targets. Legislative reform that expands the Unit’s mandate without providing sustainable resources could aggravate rather than resolve this problem.

Asset preservation, forfeiture and administrative sanctions could materially strengthen consequence management, but they also present the most difficult institutional and constitutional questions. The relationship between the SIU, NPA and AFU will need to remain clear, while any stronger coercive powers will require adequate procedural and judicial safeguards.

The September 2026 appointment of Leonard Lekgetho provides permanent leadership as these decisions are being considered. The immediate issue to watch is whether the draft developed within the Department now moves beyond internal government consultation and becomes a public legislative proposal.